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THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
DAVID LANDAU
†
 
In this short invited contribution, I argue that scholars and policy-
makers need to shift focus from the moment at which the break with the 
old regime occurs towards the moment at which new constitutional or-
ders are constructed. The constitution-making process in countries like 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, for example, is likely to determine in large 
measure what these new regimes are likely to look like. In particular, I 
draw off of a case study of the 2009 military coup in Honduras, which 
was provoked by ex-President Zelaya’s attempt to call a constituent as-
sembly, to make two points. First, both constitutional theory and interna-
tional law and politics have allowed constitution-making processes to 
occur in a vacuum—neither provides any real restraints on these pro-
cesses. Second, the main risk of constitution-making is that powerful 
individuals or political parties use either real or manufactured majori-
ties to impose constitutions on the rest of their societies. An urgent task 
in constitutional design and theory is therefore to construct models that 
will constrain this kind of constitution-making, and to find ways to en-
force those constraints.  
Recent events in the Middle East and elsewhere, as well as recent 
scholarly contributions, have again pushed to the forefront questions of 
revolutionary change and democratic transition. The events in Egypt and 
elsewhere open up possibilities for democratization and for peaceful 
change in parts of the world where this was previously thought unlikely. 
But we must avoid idealizing these moments. Revolutions and constitu-
tion-making processes are often traumatic experiences, and transitions 
from authoritarian regimes can often prove to be false ones, replacing 
these regimes with new authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments.
1
  
The key question is thus the following: what determines the end 
state of revolutions? What factors cause a revolution to end up in an ul-
timately democratic or nondemocratic outcome? Here, I think it is im-
portant to recognize that revolutions and other types of regime change
2
 
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank 
Noah Feldman, Will Partlett, Brian Sheppard, Fernando Teson, and Manuel Utset for conversations 
about the ideas in this draft. 
 1. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: 
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010); Andreas Schedler, The Logic of Electoral Authori-
tarianism, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM: THE DYNAMICS OF UNFREE COMPETITION 1, 1 
(Andreas Schedler ed., 2006) (arguing, among other things, that “[a] large number of political re-
gimes in the contemporary world . . . have established the institutional facades of democracy”). 
 2. Note that I do not in this essay carefully distinguish revolutions from other types of re-
gime changes, such as coups, because my point does not depend on how the event is categorized. 
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are sequential events, with at least two major stages. In the first stage, 
new power holders replace existing power holders in control of the gov-
ernment. For the kinds of events being considered here, this replacement 
is usually done by extralegal means. From the standpoint of the existing 
legal regime, the shift to a new government is done illegally and general-
ly in flagrant violation of the existing legal order. In the second stage, the 
new regime seeks to establish the rules under which it itself will be gov-
erned. This is the stage in which constitutions are written and new insti-
tutions created. In Egypt, for example, the first phase occurred when the 
people took to the streets and forced the removal of Mubarak. The se-
cond stage is ongoing—the interim military government is still at work 
planning the new constitution and preparing to hold the first set of elec-
tions.  
We must pay more attention, both in scholarship and in internation-
al politics, to the second stage. In particular, we must be much more at-
tuned to the process by which new institutions are constructed. Observ-
ers, diplomats, and international organizations often pay great attention 
to the dramatic moment at which an existing regime falls; these actors 
pay far less attention to the aftermath, when new institutions are con-
structed.  
Similarly, international law has traditionally had nothing to say 
about these situations, and scholarship in both comparative politics and 
comparative constitutional law have both deemphasized the constitution-
making process itself as an object of study. Traditional legal theory com-
pounds the problem by viewing constitution-making as a kind of legal 
black hole. Hans Kelsen’s theory of revolution, for example, holds that 
revolution occurs precisely when there is a decisive legal break with the 
old constitutional or legal order.
3
 Once such a break has occurred, the 
state is in a kind of legal no-man’s land until the new constitutional order 
has been constructed—there is no legal standard for evaluating the pro-
priety of acts by the interim regime.  
The manner in which the old regime collapses generally does not 
determine how the process of constructing the new regime will turn out. 
Instead, a revolution or coup generally leaves a chaotic jumble of emerg-
ing parties and civil society groups in its wake. The shape of the new 
regime will be determined by how these groups interact and participate 
to construct the basic institutions of the new regime. And thus it is the 
second stage that is likely to govern the normative desirability of revolu-
tions and other overthrows of existing regime—the key question is not 
  
The broad point is that regardless of how a regime change occurs, we should be paying much more 
attention to the attempt to construct a new regime. 
 3. See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 117 (Anders 
Wedberg trans., 1945). 
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how the old regime was overthrown, but rather what the new regime 
looks like. This process, then, is exactly where we should focus our en-
ergies as scholars. Yet, despite an outpouring of high quality recent 
work, it is still undertheorized.
4
 
Constitution-making holds great promise. Constitutional politics has 
the potential to establish the legitimacy of a new democracy across a 
broad spectrum of social groups. This sort of legitimacy is the foundation 
of a vibrant democracy. But constitution-making is also dangerous and 
commonly abused; constitution-making is often seized to impose the 
agendas of particular social groups or, even worse, of particular actors 
who are trying to consolidate power. Such processes are likely to lead to 
poorly functioning and unstable states. Thus, an important but very diffi-
cult task is to devise ways to prevent this kind of abuse from occurring. 
Rather than designing constitution-making in an attempt to reach some 
idealized end state, we may be better served by developing a “risk 
averse” model of constitutionalism, where the major goal is to prevent 
democratic breakdown.  
The rest of this response is organized as follows: In Part I, I lay out 
the importance of my object of study, explaining why we should focus 
on the constitution-making moment as the key to understanding the ef-
fects of revolutions, coups, and other methods of fundamental regime 
change. In Part II, I explain the ways in which this area is a traditional 
legal and constitutional theory, as well as international law, even when 
fortified by some pro-democratic norms, pays no real attention to ques-
tions regarding the quality of democracy in existing regimes or to the 
constitution-making processes. Part III gives an example of these prob-
lems in practice, drawing off of my own recent work as part of a team 
analyzing the 2009 coup in Honduras. While the international communi-
ty was fixated on the coup itself, it offered almost no responses to the 
dangerous abuses of constitution-making that both preceded and fol-
lowed it. The Honduran example is cautionary—it shows that constitu-
tion-making processes are often dangerous exercises.  
Part IV jumps off from another observation based on the Honduran 
case: the chief risk of constitution-making may be the risk that it will be 
abused by powerful political actors or social groups for their own ends. 
Put another way, the main risk of constitution-making seems to be that it 
may be excessively majoritarian: politicians and social groups may man-
ufacture momentary majorities, either real or invented, to remake the 
state in their image. This kind of constitution-making does lasting dam-
  
 4. For some examples of recent scholarship, see FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF 
TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING (Laurel E. Miller, ed., 2010); Ozan Varol, 
The Democratic Coup d’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2012); William Partlett, Making 
Constitutions Matter  The Dangers of Constitutional Politics in Current Post-Authoritarian Consti-
tution Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012).   
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age to democratic institutions. Finally, Part V concludes by suggesting 
that there is an urgent need to develop guidelines that will help to stop 
this kind of constitution-making, and that will incorporate these ideas 
into domestic and international politics. I do not here develop a complete 
theory of constrained or risk-averse constitution-making; that is a task I 
and other scholars have worked towards in other work.
5
 My goals here 
are more modest: I point out the difficulty in achieving constraint in the-
se moments, and the urgent need to do so. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING MOMENT 
No account of a regime’s upheaval is complete without considering 
what happens next, as coups and revolutions do not and cannot end at the 
moment in which the old regime dies. The new regime needs to organize 
itself in some fashion, by establishing fundamental rules. This is going to 
be true regardless of which political and social groups hold power after 
the coup or revolution. In the past, new authoritarian regimes might have 
settled for organizing power with some form of provisional statutes or 
other document short of a constitution. This would have permitted the 
regime to establish working rules for dealing with intra-elite disputes, 
while also giving flexibility.
6
 Recently, though, virtually all new gov-
ernments have moved relatively quickly towards the establishment of 
new constitutions. And even authoritarian regimes have generally 
clothed these constitutions in democratic garb. As Levitsky and Way 
have recently shown, there is now enough international pressure towards 
democracy that even basically authoritarian regimes like Iran and the 
more authoritarian post-Soviet states create some democratic institutions, 
such as elections, within otherwise non-democratic states.
7
  
Egypt poses a classic variant on the problem—opposition protests 
resulted in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime headed by Mubarak 
in February 2011. But this left the state with essentially no framework 
for governance; the military therefore established a temporary regime, 
quickly establishing a provisional constitution (based on amendments to 
the old constitution) in March 2011 and promising to hold elections by 
late 2011. The provisional constitution, which was drafted by the military 
and approved via wide margins in a referendum, was never intended to 
  
 5. See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012).  
 6. Even classical, personalized authoritarian regimes like Pinochet’s Chile in the 1970s 
sought to impose some form of organizing principles, initially in the form of a Statute of the Junta, 
and later a full-fledged Constitution. As Barros argued, these documents meant something—they 
served to as checks on Pinochet’s power by other members of the junta. However, even this authori-
tarian regime eventually moved towards adopting a permanent constitution, which came into effect 
in 1980. See generally ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE 
JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 167–254 (2002). 
 7. These regimes they refer to as “competitive authoritarian” states. See LEVITSKY & WAY, 
supra note 1, at 1. 
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be a permanent document.
8
 Instead, the interim regime established vague 
plans for the creation of a new text sometime after the first set of elec-
tions were held.  
Both the timing of elections and the process for writing the new 
constitution have created tension among the various social groups in 
Egypt. Islamist groups, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, have dominated 
the initial elections for Parliament, and—after initially promising not to 
run a candidate—captured the presidency.9 The military and its allies 
(particularly the judiciary) have in various ways—some clumsy, others 
more sophisticated—tried to limit the electoral power of Islamist groups. 
The military’s initial attempts to impose a set of principles on the consti-
tution-making process were met with widespread derision and renewed 
protests,
10
 but the courts have subsequently had considerable success in 
limiting the power of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the supreme admin-
istrative court suspended the constituent assembly appointed by the Par-
liament, the supreme constitutional court dissolved the Parliament itself, 
holding that the electoral rules used to elect part of the legislature were 
unconstitutional.
11
 What has emerged is a complex negotiation process 
between forces, the outcome of which will determine the future of the 
Egyptian state.   
These conflicts show that the revolution did not in any sense end 
with the overthrow of Mubarak. Nor will it be over when the first set of 
elections are held, because the new Parliament will still lack a constitu-
tional text or other principles to guide its work and to establish the basic 
institutional framework for the country. Moreover, the fights staged 
amongst the various political groups and between those groups and the 
government are critical because they will shape the new constitution and 
thus the basic character of the new regime. A constitution written by 
Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood working alone, or by the 
military working alone, would look very different from the constitution 
written by secular political groups or by all of the new groups working in 
cooperation. This first set of parliamentary elections and the new consti-
tution will define what the Egyptian revolution means. 
  
 8. Turnout at the referendum was 41.2%, and 77% of voters approved the constitutional 
changes. Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes, BBC NEWS, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125 (last updated Mar. 20, 2011, 6:05 PM). 
 9. See Leila Fadel, Final Results Confirm Islamists Winners in Egypt’s Elections, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 21, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/world/.../gIQAXpwbGQ_story.html (stating that 
the Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of seats in the lower house, and the conservative Islamist 
Salafist Nour party won 25%).     
 10. These principles offered some guarantees of the liberal nature of the new democracy, but 
also gave the military considerable autonomy and power over the new state. See Declaration of the 
Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State, Draft Dated November 1, 2011  A Commentary 
4 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2011).  
 11. See INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: 
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS ON THE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK 9–10 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/ 
Egypt_SCC_Decisions_August9.pdf. 
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And this is the normal course of affairs. There may be some cases 
where one political and social group (i.e., the military) has so much pow-
er that it will make no difference what the electoral and constitutional 
processes look like: the outcome is foreordained by the dominance of 
that group.
12
 But this situation is highly unusual—in most recent situa-
tions involving regime change (for example, Venezuela after Chavez 
came to power, Egypt, and now Libya) the situation is highly fluid, with 
new social groups and political parties organizing and a variety of new 
groups vying for control. No one faction has clear control in the new 
regime. In these cases, the constitution-making process will indeed be 
one of the key moments in shaping the character of the new regime. Yet, 
as I show in Part II, these processes fall through important gaps in both 
legal theory and in international law and politics.  
II. THE SILENCE OF LEGAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In this section, I explain why constitution-making moments consti-
tute a kind of “wild-west” both in domestic constitutional theory and in 
international law. Kelsenian theories of revolutionary break emphasize 
that revolutions occur, legally, when the new regime makes a decisive 
legal break with the old one. In other words, they occur when the old 
constitution is expressly abrogated; its procedures and substantive con-
straints are thrown out. In practice, virtually all new constitution-making 
occurs this way, because it is rare for an existing constitution to have a 
provision allowing its own replacement by an entirely new text. But this 
leaves a vacuum, because new constitutions are then written outside of 
any set of domestic legal constraints. International norms do not fill that 
vacuum; international law, even when concerned with the promotion and 
maintenance of democracy, has not developed any clear rules about what 
constitution-making must look like.  
A. Domestic Constitutional Theory 
Kelsen defines a revolution as an event that replaces the “entire le-
gal order.”13 In other words, the constitution is altered or replaced by 
some process other than the one contemplated in the text, and as result, 
the old constitution and laws lose their efficacy. In practice, almost all 
constitution-making follows this route. Very few constitutions allow for 
the calling of a constituent assembly within their text, and thorough re-
placement of a constitutional text by means found within an existing 
constitutional order is, ordinarily, likely to prove difficult or impossible. 
  
 12. Some classic authoritarian regimes, like Chile post-1973, might fit this model: the post-
authoritarian regime was dominated by a small clique of military officials. But it is notable that even 
in Chile, the military regime eventually moved towards writing a new constitution, which came into 
effect in 1980. And as Barros shows, the final product was heavily influenced by the negotiations 
between different factions of the military and by the involvement of commission’s composed of both 
right-wing and centrist lawyers. See BARROS supra note 6, at 168. 
 13. See KELSEN, supra note 3, at 118. 
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Constitutions, in other words, contemplate their amendment but almost 
never their replacement. To take examples from recent Latin American 
history, the Colombian Constitution of 1991, the Venezuelan Constitu-
tion of 1999, the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, and the Bolivian Con-
stitution of 2009 all utilized constituent assemblies to replace their con-
stitutional texts, and the use of a constituent assembly to replace the old 
constitution was not mentioned in any of the old constitutions.  
How, then, did these events occur? In some instances they are basi-
cally extralegal—courts simply refrain from passing on their legality ex 
ante, or the assembly proceeds even in the face of a negative judicial 
decision.
14
 In other cases, the court upholds the assembly, generally on 
the grounds that there is a residual power in the people to make or un-
make their constitutional order. In 1990, for example, the Colombian 
Supreme Court held that the president could proceed with elections to 
call a constituent assembly, essentially on the grounds that “the people 
. . . is the primary constituency from which all constituted and derivative 
powers emanate.”15 Thus, despite a constitution which stated only one 
method of constitutional amendment (approval by an subabsolute majori-
ty of congress in two separate congressional sessions), the public always 
has a residual power to call a constituent assembly to replace the existing 
political order.  
The consequences of both courses of events are the same—the con-
stitution-making process is subject to no clear rules or constraints under 
domestic law. In the Colombian case, for example, the court held that 
because “the Nation [is] is the primary constituency which takes on a 
sovereign character, . . . it cannot have any limits other than those it im-
poses on itself, nor can the constituted powers revise its acts.”16 In other 
words, the constituent power acts outside of all existing legal principles 
or restraints.
17
 The Venezuelan court took on the same view in 1999, 
when it held that the constituent assembly convoked by Chavez was a 
supraconstitutional body that had the power to dissolve or reorganize all 
of the existing branches of government while it worked to write a new 
  
 14. The Honduran example, discussed below in Part III, is an example of this route—Zelaya 
attempted to move forward with a non-binding vote on whether to hold a constituent assembly 
despite judicial decisions to the contrary.  
 15. RAFAEL BALLÉN M., CONSTITUYENTE Y CONSTITUCIÓN DEL 91, at 169 (1991) (giving the 
full text of the decision). 
 16. See id. at 170–71.  
 17. The Pakistan Supreme Court, in the case Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Mushar-
raf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, attempted an ex post halfway house 
between legitimating the coup of President Musharraf and restraining it. It thus legitimated the coup 
on grounds of public necessity while stating that the regime had to follow the existing constitution 
and was barred from altering its fundamental principles. Such approaches, however, are rare in 
constitutional theory, and even rarer when dealing with bodies like constituent assemblies. 
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constitution.
18
 As often conceived, domestic law has nothing to say about 
these moments. 
B. International Law 
International law has traditionally held a state’s form of government 
to be irrelevant. Historically, this was because international law was con-
cerned with relations between states rather than with the relationship 
between a state and its own citizens.
19
 But even as international law has 
built up a formidable body of law governing human rights, which pre-
vents a state from taking certain kinds of actions against its own citizens, 
the rule that international law is unconcerned with the internal govern-
ance of a state has persisted. For example, in Nicaragua v. United States, 
the International Court of Justice held that the United States’ claim that 
the Nicaraguan government was attempting to impose a “totalitarian” 
form of government was irrelevant: “Every State possesses a fundamen-
tal right to choose and implement its own political, economic and social 
systems.”20  
Changes in international law have been slow and subtle. Some 
scholars have argued that there is an emerging customary international 
law norm of democracy.
21
 But this requires consistent state practice cou-
pled with an opinion by states that they are following that practice be-
cause it constitutes binding international law (opinio juris). Given the 
variation in types of governance that still exists around the world, and 
pronouncements like the statement by the Nicaragua court, such a cus-
tomary norm seems doubtful.
22
  
  
 18. See 77–80 REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO 111 (1999); see also ALLAN R. BREWER-
CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT 
58–60 (2010) (discussing this case and its implications); Joel I. Colón-Ríos, Carl Schmitt and Con-
stituent Power in Latin American Courts  The Cases of Venezuela and Colombia, 18 
CONSTELLATIONS 365, 369–72 (2011) (discussing the Venezuelan case as a way to use the idea of 
“constituent power” to get around legal constraints). 
 19. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (4th ed. 1949) (defining international law as “the body of rules 
and principles of action which are binding upon civilized nations in their relations with one anoth-
er”). 
 20. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, *131 
(1986); see also Fernando R. Teson, Le Peuple, C'est Moi!  The World Court and Human Rights, 81 
AM. J. INT’L L. 173, 177–78 (1987) (criticizing ruling on grounds that the form of government, at 
least in extreme cases, is deeply relevant to the enjoyment of human rights in a given country and 
stating that “if the political system described as ‘totalitarian dictatorship’ results in a consistent 
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, then that system cannot valid-
ly be ‘chosen’ by a state”).  
 21. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992).  
 22. I recognize that there are resolutions by both the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the 
U.N. General Assembly affirming or suggesting that democracy is a human right. See, e.g., Commis-
sion on Human Rights Res. 1999/57, Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Apr. 27, 1999, U.N. 
CHR E/CN.4/RES/1999/57; G.A. Res. 55/2, pt. 5, U.N. Doc. A/55/L.2 (Sept. 8, 2000). However, as 
with most of the other instruments studied in this section, the Human Rights Commission and Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions do not constitute a form of binding international law.  
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At most, there are now some norms within regional treaties that 
bear on or protect the existence of international democracy; there appear 
to be no norms at the global level. And most of these norms are non-
binding forms of soft law. For example, the Commonwealth nations as-
sociated with the British crown have signed multiple declarations ex-
pressing a commitment to democratic governance.
23
 The Treaty on Euro-
pean Union in its current incarnation states democracy as a basic princi-
ple of the Union and states that adherence to the essential principles 
should be a core criterion for admission.
24
 Finally, the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (which does not enjoy the formal status of a treaty) 
explicitly states a “right to democracy,” and the preamble states that “co-
operation between American states requires the political organization of 
those states based on the effective exercise of representative democra-
cy.”25 The agreement also creates certain instruments that would aid the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in assessing and responding to 
breakdowns in democracy.
26
 These are all important regional pro-
nouncements, but none of them really represent binding international 
norms—they are all effectively forms of international soft law.27  
Perhaps more interesting are those few instances where guarantees 
of democratic governance, along with enforcement mechanisms, have 
been incorporated into regional treaty regimes. In both the Latin Ameri-
can and African cases, the emphasis is on avoiding coups or other inter-
ruptions of democratic governments. Little attention is paid to other 
problems, such as reconstituting states after interruptions or avoiding 
erosions in democracy from overreaching presidents or other figures. 
They therefore preserve international law’s traditional focus on order 
within the international community, without expanding the focus to look 
more broadly at democratic governance. The Charter of the OAS states 
that “[a] member of the Organization whose democratically constituted 
government has been overthrown by force may be suspended” by the 
  
 23. See, e.g., Heads of Gov’t in Harare, Zim., Harare Commonwealth Declaration, THE 
COMMON WEALTH (Oct. 20, 1991), http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/ 
GFSR.asp?NodeID=141095 (reaffirming a commitment to “democracy, democratic processes and 
institutions”). 
 24. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. 
(C 115) 13 (stating democracy as a basic value); id. art. 49 (requiring that states “respect[] the val-
ues” referred to in article 2 to become members of the Union), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF. 
 25. Inter-American Democratic Charter, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Sept. 11, 2001) pmbl., art. 1, 
http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm. 
 26. The Charter allows a state to request the support of the Secretary General of the OAS 
whenever the democratic institutional order may be at risk. See id., arts. 17–18. It also provides that 
the OAS should immediately use diplomatic means to repair an “unconstitutional interruption” of 
democracy or a “unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime” that significantly impairs 
democracy in a country. See id., arts. 20–21. If these efforts fail, the OAS is empowered to suspend 
the violating state by a two-thirds vote. See id., art. 21.  
 27. International soft law is not binding on states or individuals, although it often has consid-
erable persuasive or other significance. See, e.g., Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 499 (1999). 
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OAS.
28
 Somewhat similarly, the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
provides that “[g]overnments which shall come to power through uncon-
stitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of 
the Union.”29 Both of these are essentially anti-coup clauses; they prohib-
it the unconstitutional replacement of one democratic regime by another, 
but they say nothing about post-revolutionary circumstances where a 
new democracy is being constituted, or about situations where an incum-
bent leader is taking steps to weaken democracy.  
This kind of a focus—on dramatic interruptions like coups rather 
than on other types of events that threaten democratic governance in sub-
tle but important ways—is confirmed by looking at the way in which 
these instruments have been carried out, and more broadly on how the 
international community responds to different kinds of threats to democ-
racy. The suspension mechanisms in the OAS and African Union are 
sometimes invoked in response to unconstitutional overthrows of demo-
cratic governance, as occurred in Honduras after President Zelaya was 
removed in 2009,
30
 and in Cote d’Ivoire, where President Bedie was 
overthrown by a military coup in 1999.
31
 But where Hugo Chavez in 
Venezuela used his lawfully elected position to undermine other demo-
cratic institutions by, for example, closing and intimidating hostile media 
and weakening and packing the country’s Congress, Supreme Court, and 
control institutions like the Ombudsman, the response of the OAS was 
much more tepid. The organization has done virtually nothing, because 
in the absence of an unconstitutional interruption in democracy that 
might trigger the suspension clause, it is able to monitor and facilitate 
dialogue only at the invitation of the Venezuelan state.
32
  
Even if international organizations wanted to intervene, it is unclear 
whether and how they could do so. As noted by Franck and 
Thiruvengadam, there is “no firm evidence of rules applicable to the pro-
cess of constitution making” within international law.33 While the au-
thors try to leverage both the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and recent practice as a source for emerging legal norms, the 
most that can be found is a general set of principles about public partici-
  
 28. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States (A-56), 
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, WASHINGTON D.C. (Dec. 14, 1992), 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-56_Protocol_of_Washington.htm. 
 29. CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION July 11, 2000, art. 30, available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm. 
 30. See discussion infra Part III. 
 31. See Theodore J. Piccone, International Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy, in 
PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 101, 119 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna 
Galic eds., 2005) (discussing the Bedie case). 
 32. See id. at 107 (discussing the ineffectiveness of the OAS’s attempted responses to 
Chavez); see also supra note 26 (explaining the mechanisms created by the Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter to protect democracy). 
 33. Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to 
the Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES 
IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 3, 14 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010). 
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pation in constitution-making processes.
34
 This is probably too vague a 
principle to be much good at restraining the risks posed by constitution-
making that are outlined in Parts III and IV below.
35
  
More broadly, the international community often responds far more 
forcefully and readily to regime changes than it does to the complex but 
more important series of events occurring after the regime change. Egypt 
and Libya offer recent examples: the attention of world media and world 
governments was fixated in winter and early spring 2011 on the fall of 
the Mubarak regime, and again in late spring and summer of 2011 on the 
attempts of the rebels to dislodge Quaddafi with NATO support. But the 
questions surrounding the subsequent construction of democratic gov-
ernance in Egypt have received far less attention. There is little doubt 
that the new Libyan leaders will be in a similar position. The example of 
Honduras leading up to and following the 2009 removal of President 
Zelaya, which I lay out in the next section, offers similar examples.  
III. HONDURAS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SILENCE IN ACTION 
In this section, I explain how Honduras offers an example of the 
gaps in domestic and international law that I laid out in Part II. The point 
is no longer that international law is wholly unresponsive to questions of 
form of government. The point is that that response was focused only on 
a narrow swath of issues. The OAS and other international actors re-
sponded vigorously to the illegal overthrow of President Zelaya in 
2009.
36
 However, there was virtually no international reaction to the var-
ious illegal actions taken by President Zelaya before the overthrow, 
which could have damaged the institutional framework of Honduran 
democracy. Nor is there currently any attention paid to the new govern-
ment’s movement towards rewriting the entire Honduran Constitution.  
Moreover, this section supports my argument that changes in gov-
ernment are complex, multi-stage events, and that it is critical to expand 
the focus beyond the moment in which an old regime is brought down. 
The Honduran example is much closer to a coup than a revolution; but 
  
 34. The authors use article 1 of the ICCPR, which creates a right to “self-determination,” and 
article 25, which gives a right “to take part in the conduct of public affairs.” See id. at 5–6.  
 35. I do not mean to imply that the international community is always uninvolved in constitu-
tion-making processes. Various post-conflict constitutions have been drafted with a high degree of 
United Nations involvement—one can think of East Timor, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, for example. 
See, e.g., Vijayashri Sripati, The United Nation’s Role in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making Pro-
cesses  TWAIL Insights, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 411, 415 (2008). But these tend to occur in 
situations where the domestic state has been destroyed and domestic institutions and social groups 
gravely weakened. In such instances, the international community essentially substitutes for domes-
tic institutions in constructing the new constitutional order, and it acts according to sets of best 
practices that it has developed rather than according to clear legal rules.  
 36. Most importantly, they quickly suspended Honduras from the Organization. See, e.g., 
Ginger Thompson & Marc Lacey, O.A.S. Votes to Suspend Honduras Over Coup, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 2009, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/americas/ 
05honduras.html?pagewanted=all.  
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even though the events simply changed the identity of the ruler rather 
than thoroughly altering politics and society, the most important events 
may be occurring after the coup rather than during the coup itself. The 
actual change in regime in 2009—the irregular overthrow of President 
Zelaya—was an important event in Honduran politics and society, but it 
occurred in the middle of a much longer chain of events. Prior to the 
removal, Zelaya himself engaged in a series of events that were calculat-
ed to weaken Honduran democracy.
37
 And the new regime has strongly 
suggested that it will seek to engage in either a significant constitutional 
reform or the writing of a new constitution.
38
 How this constitutional 
reform process is carried out will go a long way towards determining 
whether Honduran democracy will be strengthened or gravely weakened 
in the longer run. 
The analysis in this section is based heavily on work that I under-
took, as part of a team including Noah Feldman, Brian Sheppard, and 
Leonidas Rosa-Suazo, to analyze constitutional issues surrounding the 
removal of Zelaya for the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation of 
Honduras. Our task was both to analyze the constitutionality of the ac-
tions of both Zelaya and those removing him, and to make prospective 
suggestions for constitutional reforms in order to prevent a recurrence 
and to strengthen Honduran democracy.
39
  
Our essential finding was that both sides acted unconstitutionally at 
various key points. Zelaya won election in a political environment that is 
notoriously closed and exclusionary.
40
 The political system is controlled 
by the two traditional parties, the Liberal and National parties. Moreover, 
these parties themselves are controlled by a small collection of largely 
homogenous elites that also control most of the economic power in the 
country.
41
 Zelaya, who himself is part of this group, won election as an 
orthodox liberal, but began taking positions of a more “populist” variety 
that were at variance with the leadership of his own party. From a foreign 
policy perspective, he began aligning himself with Hugo Chavez, signing 
several agreements, for example, to receive subsidized petroleum and 
other kinds of aid.
42
 From a domestic perspective, he adopted a vague 
  
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 40–49.         
 38. See infra text accompanying notes 78–80.       
 39. The full text of this report is available in both English and Spanish. See Noah Feldman, 
David Landau, Brian Sheppard & Leonidas Rosa Suazo, Report to the Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation of Honduras  Constitutional Issues (Fla. State Coll. of Law, Pub. Law, Research 
Paper No. 536, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915214. 
 40. See Michelle M. Taylor, When Electoral and Party Institutions Interact to Produce Cau-
dillo Politics  The Case of Honduras, 15 ELECTORAL STUD. 327, 328–29 (1996) (providing a useful 
overview of the basic nature and history of Honduran politics).  
 41. See id. at 331–32. 
 42. See, e.g., Central America  Zelaya Plays the Chávez Card, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2008, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/12522958?story_id=12522958.  
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discourse and policy in favor of participation by a broader set of actors.
43
 
He also began issuing increasingly strident attacks against the other insti-
tutions of the Honduran government, including the Congress and the 
Supreme Court.
44
  
Zelaya’s rhetoric aimed to delegitimize traditional political actors 
and to gain political support from a broader range of traditionally mar-
ginalized political groups. His root goal appeared to be the strengthening 
of his personal political power. He began signaling in late 2008 that he 
would seek to call a constitutional convention to write an entirely new 
constitutional text, replacing the current constitution of 1982.
45
 While 
Zelaya never stated that he intended to reform the constitutional article 
prohibiting presidential reelection, and indeed stated that he intended to 
hold only one term in power, the widely held assumption was that he 
would use the convention to extend his own term.
46
  
This effort was complicated by two features of the Honduran Con-
stitution. First, Article 373 establishes only one method for constitutional 
reform: approval by two-thirds of Congress in two different congression-
al sessions.
47
 It says nothing about the legality of a constituent assembly. 
Second, Article 374 establishes that certain provisions, including the 
prohibition on presidential reelection, cannot be reformed under any cir-
cumstances.
48
 Article 239 enforces the prohibition on reelection by man-
dating that anyone who “breaks the prohibition or proposes its reform, 
along with those who support [that effort] directly or indirectly” will 
  
 43. For example, one of President Zelaya’s first acts as president was to sign a new “Law of 
Citizen’s Participation.” See Ley No. 30,917, 27 Jan. 2006, Ley de Participacion Ciudadana [Law of 
Citizen’s Participation] Decreto 3-2006, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 1 Feb. 2006 (Hond.), 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Honduras/Leyes/LeyParticipacion.pdf (stating that “sovereignty 
belongs to the people, from which emanates the powers of the State,” and therefore that the govern-
ment is based on “the principle of participatory democracy).  
 44. For example, Zelaya failed to present a 2009 budget to Congress by the constitutional 
deadline of September 15, 2008, and thus no budget was passed for that year. The Congress and 
Supreme Court both claimed that they received no budgetary allocations in 2009, up until the point 
when Zelaya was removed from power. See Presupuesto 2009 no llega al Congreso Nacional [2009 
Budget Does Not Come to Congress], LA PRENSA (Hond.) (Feb. 5, 2009, 11:02PM), 
http://archivo.laprensa.hn/Pa%c3%ads/Ediciones/2009/02/06/Noticias/Presupuesto-2009-no-llega-
al-Congreso-Nacional.  
 45. See Manuel Zelaya propone asamblea constituyente [Manuel Zelaya Proposed Constitu-
ent Assembly], EL HERALDO (Hond.) (Nov. 22, 2008, 11:15AM), 
http://www.heraldohn.com/index.php/content/view/full/46876. 
 46. See id.; see also Buscan crear vacío de poder en Honduras [Seek to Create a Power 
Vacuum in Honduras], EL HERALDO (Hond.) (Jan. 16, 2009, 10:20PM), 
http://eng.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/69737 (describing the view of other political actors who 
believed Zelaya would attempt to perpetuate himself in power). 
 47. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] tit. VII, ch. I, art. 
373, 11 Jan. 1982, as interpreted by Decreto No. 169/1986. 
 48. See id. art. 374 (rendering unamendable, inter alia, provisions dealing with the form of 
government, the national territory, the length of the presidential term, and the prohibition on being 
reelected president). 
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cease immediately in her office and be ineligible to serve any public 
function for ten years.
49
  
At any rate, Zelaya pressed forward with his plans for the constitu-
ent assembly, issuing several decrees ordering the carrying out of a na-
tionwide “consultation” or “poll” on June 28, 2009, to see whether the 
public supported the effort.
50
 The decrees stated that the consultation 
would be non-binding and would be used as political support for 
Zelaya’s project.51 An administrative court in May 2009 blocked the first 
decree, and the court’s order was not successfully appealed. Zelaya then 
essentially issued the same order under a slightly different name, and the 
court issued a “clarification” to its order to cover the new decree.52 None-
theless, Zelaya pressed forward with his plans. Allegedly, the Supreme 
Court opened a criminal investigation of the president on various 
grounds (including treason and abuse of authority) on June 26, 2009, and 
issued an arrest warrant, to be carried out by military officials, on June 
27. The military arrived at Zelaya’s house on the morning of June 28 
and, instead of taking him to the country’s Supreme Court as allegedly 
specified in the warrant, took him on a plane and carried him to Costa 
Rica.
53
 Later that day, the Congress purported to “separate” Zelaya from 
the office of president and to appoint the president of the Congress (Rob-
erto Micheleti) as interim president. The Congress took this action even 
though it lacked any explicit presidential impeachment or removal pow-
er.
54
  
The public debate in Honduras about the legality of Zelaya’s actions 
centered largely on whether it was legally possible to hold a constituent 
assembly to write an entirely new constitution, including the prohibition 
on presidential reelection.
55
 Those are very difficult questions to answer 
  
 49. See id. ch. VI, art. 239, 11 Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 374/2002 and ratified by 
Decreto No. 153/2003. (“[W]hosoever breaks this disposition or proposes its reform, as well as those 
who directly or indirectly support him, shall immediately cease in the exercise of their office and 
will be disqualified from the exercise of any public function for ten (10) years.”) 
 50. See Decreto No. PCM-005-2009 (Hond.) (ordering a “public consultation” managed by 
the National Institute of Statistics); Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, LA GACETA DIARIO 
OFICIAL [L.G.], 25 June 2008 (Hond.) (changing the name of the “public consultation” to a poll); 
Acuerdo Ejecutivo No. 027-2009 (Hond.) (ordering the armed forces to provide “support” for the 
“poll”). 
 51. See Decreto PCM-005-2009, art. 3 (Hond.) (“The positive result of this popular consulta-
tion will serve as a legitimate basis for the Executive to send to the National Congress a special legal 
project to place the [issue] on the ballot in the general elections of November 2009.”).    
 52. See Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, L.G., 25 June 2008 (Hond.) (changing the name 
of the “consultation” to a “poll”). 
 53. See, e.g., Micheletti Sucede a “Mel” [Micheletti Happens to “Mel”], LA TRIBUNA 
(Hond.) (June 29, 2009), http://www.latribuna.hn/2009/06/29/micheletti-sucede-a-
%E2%80%9Cmel%E2%80%9D/.  
 54. See, e.g., id.  
 55. See, e.g., Edmundo Orellana, Golpe de Estado en Honduras [Coup in Honduras], 
VOSELOBERANO.COM (Sept. 27, 2009), available at 
http://voselsoberano.com/v1/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=856:golpe-de-
estado-en-honduras-un-analisis-juridico-por-edmundo-orellana&catid=17:debate-juridico (arguing 
that a constituent assembly would be possible in the existing framework).  
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from within an existing constitutional framework. Most constitutions are 
silent about their own replacement by new texts. And even if a constitu-
tion had an explicit prohibition on constituent assemblies or on the writ-
ing of new texts, arguably the public retains an inherent and inalienable 
power to rewrite their constitution.  
Our analysis focused much more on serious problems in the consti-
tution-making process. Regardless of whether Zelaya somehow could 
have moved towards convoking a constituent assembly, he did not follow 
procedures that were mandated by Honduran law and would have been 
necessary to ensure the fairness of the process. First, Zelaya had no legal 
authority to call for the vote, and he did not seek the Congress’s assent to 
the passage of a new law that would have given him that authority.
56
 
Even the consideration of the convoking of a constituent assembly is a 
serious event better processed on the basis of consensus or near consen-
sus. Zelaya instead set up his project in opposition to both the Congress 
and the judiciary, as part of a general pattern of attacks against those 
institutions.
57
  
Moreover, while the constitution sets up a fairly well-functioning 
Supreme Electoral Tribunal as the institution charged with supervising 
elections,
58
 Zelaya instead placed his “consultation” or “poll” under the 
charge of a National Institute of Statistics, which is basically the Hondu-
ran equivalent of the census bureau.
59
 The Electoral Tribunal has the 
capacity and experience to monitor polling places and ensure the overall 
fairness of an election; the National Institute of Statistics had none of 
these capabilities. Finally, and even more troublingly, Zelaya ordered the 
military to “support” the “poll,” basically using the specter of military 
force as a cudgel against those groups who opposed the effort.
60
The mili-
tary ordinarily provides logistical support during elections, but under the 
authority and orders of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; Zelaya instead 
invoked his direct authority as chief of the armed forces.
61
  
  
 56. Zelaya attempted to use the Law of Citizen Participation as support for his action, see 
supra note 46, but it was clear that that law did not give him the power to carry out a nationwide 
vote, even if non-binding. 
 57. See supra note 44.  
 58. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] ch. V, art. 51, 11 
Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 154/2003 (creating a Supreme Electoral Tribunal charged 
with “everything related with electoral acts and procedures”). 
 59. See Decreto No. PCM-005-2009 (Hond.); Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, L.G., 25 
June 2009 (Hond.) (both providing that the National Institute of Statistics would “supervise the 
effective execution” of the consultation or poll). 
 60. See Acuerdo Ejecutivo No. 027-2009 (Hond.). 
 61. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] ch. X, art. 272, 11 
Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 245/1998 and ratified by Decreto No. 2/1999 (ordering the 
president to place the military at the disposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal one month before 
all elections). 
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In short, we regarded the question of whether Zelaya could legally 
have moved towards a constituent assembly as relatively unimportant.
62
 
It was far more relevant that the particular process he had chosen lacked 
legitimacy. He moved forward without ensuring that any sort of consen-
sus or near consensus existed. And his choice of institutions—the Na-
tional Institute of Statistics and military—to support the vote would not 
have provided any guarantee of fairness in outcome.  
We were also struck by the nature of the international reaction sur-
rounding the incident. The condemnation by almost all countries and by 
the OAS of the illegal removal of President Zelaya by the military and 
congress was proper. For example, the OAS condemned the incident as a 
“coup d’etat” and suspended Honduras under its democracy clauses,63 
while the Obama Administration also sharply condemned the removal as 
“illegal” and demanded the restoration of Zelaya.64 There was a constitu-
tional procedure to remove Zelaya—trial before the Supreme Court—but 
the actors opposed to Zelaya did not follow that process. In so doing, 
they raised the specter, which had long plagued democratic governance 
in the region, of military intervention in politics. International organiza-
tions and other states rightly condemned the actions of those opposed to 
Zelaya.  
But there was little condemnation of Zelaya’s actions prior to his 
removal. And it is critical to see that these actions too raised the specter 
of a serious threat to democratic governance: the threat that a strong-man 
president will use his power to undermine other institutions of govern-
ment and essentially erode democracy from within. This is no mere fan-
tasy, and in fact has been far more common in recent times in Latin 
America than direct military intervention in politics.
65
 Following 
Levitsky and Way’s argument, pro-democracy norms have now become 
sufficiently entrenched that obviously anti-democratic action like mili-
  
 62. There are plenty of examples of new constitutions being written outside of the structure of 
existing constitutional law, but in ways that clearly produce highly legitimate texts. Colombia in 
1991, for example, convoked a constituent assembly and wrote an entirely new constitution to re-
place the Constitution of 1886, even though the Constitution (as in Honduras) only gave the Con-
gress the power to amend the constitutional text. Yet the constitution-making process has produced a 
highly legitimate text. See supra text accompanying notes 59–62. 
 63. See OAS Suspends Membership of Honduras, ORG. OF AM. STATES (July 5, 2009), 
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09. 
 64. See, e.g., PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34027, HONDURAN-U.S. 
RELATIONS 14 (2009), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128853.pdf; see also 
Noah Feldman, David Landau & Brian Sheppard, Op-Ed., Fixing Honduras, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 
2011, at 11, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jun/07/opinion/la-oe-landau-
honduras-20110607 (noting the significant “real-world effects,” like loss of foreign aid, of the inter-
national steps taken against Honduras).  
 65. Aside from the Honduran case, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Evo 
Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Alvaro Uribe in Colombia have all arguably 
attempted similar erosions of democratic governance. See, e.g., Scott Mainwaring, The Crisis of 
Representation in the Andes, in LATIN AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 18, 18–19 (Larry 
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner & Diego Abente Brun eds., 2008).  
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tary coups has become disfavored.
66
 But subtler attacks on the democrat-
ic institutions that provide “horizontal accountability” to presidents, like 
congresses and courts, may be more acceptable.
67
 At the very least, the 
president can use the mantle of “popular legitimacy,” arguing that he is 
carrying out the people’s will while other institutions are frustrating it. 
Zelaya repeatedly relied on that sort of rhetoric.
68
 Chavez in Venezuela 
and Fujimori in Peru provide clear examples of this threat—each under-
took serious manipulation of legislatures and courts to attain maximal 
power.
69
 Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, and Uribe in Colombia 
have all provided more but still troubling cases of the same trend.
70
 In-
ternal erosion of democracy, rather than the military coup, is now the 
major threat to democracy in Latin America and perhaps in most of the 
world. 
Yet the United States merely observed blandly that Zelaya’s refer-
endum was an internal matter and requested that the relevant parties 
come to a “consensual democratic resolution.”71 The OAS, however, 
played a more pernicious role. The OAS Secretary-General agreed, at 
Zelaya’s request, to send a mission to observe Zelaya’s “poll” or “con-
sultation.”72 The Secretary-General stated that due to the “nature” of the 
vote, this mission would be a “mission of accompaniment,” rather than 
the standard “electoral mission” that would observe an election and that 
is explicitly mentioned in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
73
 Re-
gardless of the formal name for the mission, the Secretary-General’s 
action served as a form of legitimization for Zelaya’s “consultation.” 
Some commentators have suggested that politics played a role in the 
Secretary-General actions, noting his closeness to Chavez and other Lat-
in America leaders within his sphere of influence.
74
 But the ideological 
structure of international law and politics also played an important role: 
  
 66. See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 1, at 43–54. 
 67. In Guillermo O’Donnell’s model of delegative democracy, popular presidents use their 
link to the public in order to weaken other institutions that might serve as checks on their power. See 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 59–62 (1994); see also Guiller-
mo O’Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: 
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 29, 29 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999) 
(arguing that many developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere are plagued by the “ab-
sence” of horizontal accountability). 
 68. See supra text accompanying note 47.  
 69. See Mainwaring, supra note 65, at 22–24. 
 70. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Seligson, The Rise of Populism and the Left, in LATIN AMERICA’S 
STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 65, at 77, 77. 
 71. See MEYER, supra note 66, at 14. 
 72. See OEA Analiza Enviar Misión a Honduras  El Organismo Internacional Tendrá un 
Enviado Especial para Mediar en el Problema, EL HERALDO (Hond.), June 26, 2009, 
http://www.elheraldo.hn/Al%20Frente/Ediciones/2009/06/26/Noticias/OEA-analiza-enviar-mision-
a-Honduras. 
 73. See id.; see also Inter-American Democratic Charter, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Sept. 11, 
2001) arts. 23–25, http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm.  
 74. See generally The Facts and the Law Behind the Democratic Crisis in Honduras, 2009  A 
Constitutional and International Democracy Law Analysis, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://thehrf.org/HRF_TheFactsAndTheLaw_Honduras2009.pdf.  
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the ire of the OAS and the international community was properly and 
forcefully invoked against the removal of Zelaya. And the OAS’s clear 
provisions against “interruptions” of democratic governments were used 
to suspend the new Honduran regime. But the international community 
lacked a set of conceptual or legal tools to respond to Zelaya’s attempts 
to undermine the other institutions in his own democracy.  
The aftermath of the removal offers similar lessons. After new elec-
tions were held in November 2009, and the interim president, Micheleti, 
was replaced by a new permanent president from the National Party, 
Porfirio Lobo, the reaction of the international community began to sof-
ten. The State Department in the United States “noted that it recognized 
the complicated nature of events” in Honduras.75 Moreover, Zelaya and 
the regime reached a set of agreements that granted him legal immunity 
for actions taken during the crisis and allowed him to return to the coun-
try. And in June 2011, the OAS lifted the suspension of Honduras from 
the organization by an overwhelming vote of thirty-two in favor and only 
one (Ecuador) against.
76
 The message of the international community 
was that the intervening events in the country—both electoral politics 
and the accord between Zelaya and the regime—had cleansed the dam-
age done by the removal of Zelaya. Thus, normalcy had been restored, 
and Honduran politics once again became a wholly domestic affair. 
The problem is that politics in the country had not really been re-
stored to normal. There were documented human rights abuses against 
Zelaya’s supporters in the aftermath of his removal, and the election of 
Lobo in November 2009, while untainted by fraud, was also not con-
ducted in a fully open environment.
77
 Moreover, the Honduran state had 
suffered a deep crisis of legitimacy; such a crisis cannot be healed in a 
short period of time. In this social and political context, there have been 
recurring calls for a new overhaul of the Constitution. Some constitu-
tional articles have already been reformed—for example Article 5, which 
regulates plebiscites and referenda, has been broadened to make these 
devices easier to use and to possibly allow for sweeping constitutional 
reforms via some sort of direct democracy.
78
 The current presidential 
administration has suggested that it favors these reforms, and the com-
mon understanding is that its emphasis is on doing exactly what Zelaya 
  
 75. See Feldman, Landau & Sheppard, supra note 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 76. See OAS Lifts Honduras Suspension After Zelaya Agreement, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13622939. 
 77. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM’N HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, HONDURAS: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COUP D’ETAT 59–62 (2009), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/HONDURAS2009ENG.pdf (documenting both human rights 
abuses and problems in November 2009 election).  
 78. See CN Aprobó Reformas a la Constitución de Honduras, EL HERALDO (Hond.), Jan. 12, 
2011, http://www.elheraldo.hn/Ediciones/2011/01/12/Noticias/CN-aprobo-reformas-a-Constitucion-
de-Honduras. 
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was trying to do: change the constitution to allow for presidential reelec-
tion.
79
  
This overhaul is not particularly popular with the public: a recent 
poll showed that just less than half of the population favored significant 
reforms.
80
 In the wake of the serious trauma faced by the Honduran de-
mocracy, such a result is, at first blush, surprising. But I think it is ex-
plained by the way in which these reforms have been framed: it is obvi-
ous to citizens that the push for constitutional reforms has occurred be-
cause of specific, short-term political agendas. As with Zelaya, it appears 
that the discourse about popular legitimacy, increased participation, and 
constitutional politics is a cover for the continuation of the power games 
that have always been played between the small Honduran elite.  
IV. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
The Honduran example highlights the main risk of constitution-
making: that momentarily powerful actors or groups will use the consti-
tution-making process to remake the state in order to serve their own 
interests. Typically, they use claims to majoritarian support (whether true 
or false), and tools such as plebiscites and referenda, in order to make an 
end-run around existing democratic institutions.  
Recent work by Partlett demonstrates this risk in Eastern Europe. 
Partlett draws heavily on the example of Russia, where Yeltsin withdrew 
the constitution-making process from Parliament and moved it to an ap-
pointed constituent assembly in order to take more control over the pro-
cess. In other words, in Russia the invocation of a constitutional moment 
was a ruse used by the president, and the resulting constitution has 
lacked legitimacy and has failed to constrain strong-man Russian execu-
tives.
81
 
In Latin America, constitution-making in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia, along with the Honduran example explored above, demonstrates 
the same risk to varying degrees.
82
 Venezuela is perhaps the classic ex-
ample. Hugo Chavez, who had formerly led a failed coup attempt against 
the political system in 1992,
83
 won the presidential election in 1998 with 
  
 79. See, e.g., Lobo Consultará a Sectores Sobre Posible Reforma Constitucional en Hondu-
ras, LA NACIÓN (Costa Rica), June 29, 2011, http://www.nacion.com/2011-06-29/Mundo/Lobo-
consultara-a-sectores-sobre-posible-reforma-constitucional-en-Honduras.aspx.  
 80. See id.  
 81. See William Partlett, Making Constitutions Matter  The Dangers of Constitutional Politics 
in Current Post-Authoritarian Constitution Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924958 (looking also at examples 
in Belarus and Kazakhstan). 
 82. For a fuller exploration of the Venezuelan and Bolivian examples, see Landau, supra note 
5.     
 83. See Felipe Agüero, Crisis and Decay of Democracy in Venezuela  The Civil-Military 
Dimension, in VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS 215, 215–16 (Jennifer McCoy et al. eds., 
1995) (recounting the coup attempt). 
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56% of the vote. Chavez arrived at a perilous moment for the democra-
cy—the country’s once very-strong two traditional parties had lost legit-
imacy because of successive corruption scandals and because they 
seemed out of touch with citizens.
84
 Chavez thus won election as an anti-
system outsider. Chavez campaigned on a promise to hold a constituent 
assembly, and once elected moved forward with plans to call a constitu-
ent assembly and remake the democracy. He promised to abolish Vene-
zuela’s traditional system, which was dominated by two traditional par-
ties, and to create a more inclusive, socially transformative democracy.
85
  
While Chavez was fairly popular in Venezuela, the rules for com-
posing the constituent assembly manufactured total dominance by pro-
Chavez forces and marginalized all of the opposition.
86
 Rather than using 
pure proportional representation as in Colombia, Venezuela used an elec-
toral system based on either single-member districts or small regional 
districts electing a small number of delegates.
87
 This resulted in the mas-
sive overrepresentation of pro-Chavez forces. While Chavez had won 
election in 1998 with only 56% of the vote, and while his forces only 
won 65% of the vote in the Assembly, he won 93% of the seats in the 
Assembly and was able to achieve exactly the constitution he envisioned. 
The tiny opposition had no power to block or alter any of Chavez’s pro-
posals.
88
  
The resulting process strengthened Chavez’s powers and wiped 
away many of the existing checks on the president. First, the constituent 
assembly replaced the members of most of the other institutions of state 
(including the Supreme Court, National Electoral Council, Congress, and 
state legislative assemblies).
89
 It used its “constituent powers” to take 
these actions, which were upheld by the supreme court on the grounds 
that the constituent assembly was not bound by the legal constraints of 
either the existing or new constitutional order.
90
 The Assembly also 
drafted a constitution that suited Chavez by allowing for a very strong 
chief executive. Indeed, the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution has been 
  
 84. See Michael Coppedge, Partidocracia and Reform in Comparative Perspective, in 
VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS, supra note 83, at 173, 174, 187–90 (explaining the 
decline of the party system). 
 85. See Renata Segura & Ana María Bejarano, ¡Ni una Asamblea Más sin Nosotros! Exclu-
sion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 217, 
224–25 (2004). 
 86. The traditional parties also helped to marginalize themselves by boycotting the constituent 
assembly. See id. at 225–28. 
 87. See id. at 230 (noting that the opposition received more than 34% of the vote but grabbed 
only 4.6% of the seats). 
 88. For the view of one of the members of the opposition during the Assembly, see generally 
BREWER-CARÍAS, supra note 18, at 35–68. 
 89. See Allan R. Brewer-Carías, The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution-Making Process as an 
Instrument for Framing the Development of an Authoritarian Political Regime, in FRAMING THE 
STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 505, 507 (Laurel E. 
Miller ed., 2010).  
 90. See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining this decision and its logic). 
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called “[h]yperpresidential.”91 For example, it allowed presidential 
reelection for the first time in many decades and lengthened the presiden-
tial term from five to six years.
92
 It also weakened other institutions, for 
example by abolishing the Senate and by making the judiciary much 
more dependent on the Congress than it had been previously.
93
 There can 
be little doubt in the Venezuelan case that the constitution-making pro-
cess is linked to the constitutional outcome, and it is not difficult to argue 
that the Constitution undermined existing institutions and caused long-
run harm to the quality of Venezuelan democracy.  
If I am correct about the main peril of constitution-making, then this 
suggests that the existing literature on the topic needs to be reframed. 
The existing literature on constitution-making is dominated by Elster, 
who argues that probably the core task of the constitution-making pro-
cess is avoiding deliberation based on short-term interest.
94
 Delegates 
must be forced to consider the long-term interest of the country rather 
than their immediate short-term political goals. Thus, for example, con-
stitutions should be drafted in special chambers like constitutional as-
semblies rather than in ordinary legislatures, and delegates should be 
ineligible to run for office immediately after serving in the assembly.
95
  
Yet if the main risk of constitution-making is instead the risk of 
abuse by temporarily popular figures seeking to enhance their power, 
then we will need a different set of design recommendations. Presenta-
tion of a model keyed to this risk is the topic of my current work and is 
beyond the scope of the current project.
96
 But the main need is to find 
rules and principles that will restrain the ability of powerful individual 
figures, minorities, or temporary majorities from imposing their own 
desired constitution.
97
 Given the current state of domestic constitutional 
theory and international law, this will not be an easy task, but it is urgent. 
  
 91. See JAVIER CORRALES & MICHAEL PENFOLD, DRAGON IN THE TROPICS: HUGO CHÁVEZ 
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION IN VENEZUELA 16 (2011). 
 92. See id. at 19 
 93. See id. 
 94. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 
364, 394 (1995).  
 95. See id. at 395 (“The most important [implication] is perhaps that to reduce the scope for 
institutional interest, constitutions ought to be written by specially convened assemblies and not by 
bodies that also serve as ordinary legislatures.”). 
 96. A more complete theorization is developed in David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone 
Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  
 97. Andrew Arato produces a very helpful analysis of constitution-making in Iraq; he argues 
that the effort was hamstrung because the Occupation did not take seriously the need to allow partic-
ipation from all affected groups. See ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER 
OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 122–23, 255–56 (2009). In a pro-
vocative recent article, Partlett emphasizes the advantages of drafting constitutions in ordinary 
political bodies like congresses rather than constituent assemblies or other extralegal processes like 
extraordinary referenda. See PARTLETT, supra note 81, at 27–29. Whether drafting constitutions 
using ordinary political institutions rather than extraordinary ones is an adequate check is a more 
difficult issue. For example, both Congresses and Constituent Assemblies can be abused if they can 
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In Egypt and in other countries with a swirl of emerging political 
parties and civil society groups, this likely means that electoral rules 
should be structured to try and deny any one faction (say the Islamicist 
parties) a clear majority. In Honduras, Colombia, and other countries 
with historically exclusionist political systems, it means that electoral 
rules and other devices should be used to give representation to groups 
that have historically been excluded from the political process. The exact 
tools to achieve these goals will be highly context-specific. Proportional 
representation rather than a majoritarian electoral system, for example, 
should generally help to achieve greater representativeness and avoid the 
overrepresentation of the most popular parties are groups.
98
 But while the 
exclusion of current or even past politicians may be desirable in contexts 
where the main problem has been the closed nature of the existing politi-
cal system (as in Honduras and Colombia), it may be highly undesirable 
in new democracies like Egypt, where there is a pressing need for politi-
cal expertise and technical skill in the assembly. 
The basic analysis—that processes must be structured so as to min-
imize the ability of individual groups to dominate—has other important 
implications. In Egypt and in other situations experiencing a democratic 
transition, civil society and political parties remain inchoate. Some 
movements, in this case the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist 
groups, were much more organized than other elements during the Mu-
barak regime. The domination of these movements in early elections may 
reflect in part their organizational advantages rather than genuine popu-
larity. In this context, the role of the military and judiciary in restraining 
these forces becomes highly difficult to evaluate. As noted in Part II, the 
military-backed judiciary has taken extreme measures, including dissolv-
ing the Parliament, in order to slow the electoral power of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Most domestic and international commentators have 
viewed these measures as a “judicial coup” or as otherwise fundamental-
ly undemocratic. But the reality may be more complex—as Ozan Varol 
has recently argued, the military can actually play pro-democratic roles 
during many democratic transitions.
99
 Further, as Sam Issacharoff sug-
gests, fragile or unstable democracies may need illiberal institutions in 
order to stave off implosion from within.
100
   
  
be controlled by a single political group. Perhaps more important than the chamber where a constitu-
tion is written is the composition of that chamber and the rules under which it will make decisions.  
 98. See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF 
TWENTY-SEVEN DEMOCRACIES 1945–1990, at 54–77 (1994) (showing how pure proportional repre-
sentation tends to translate votes exactly into seats, while majoritarian systems overrepresent the 
largest parties, sometimes massively). 
 99. Varol, supra note 4.    
 100. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007) (arguing that 
weak democracies may need to use party-banning and other techniques to ensure that anti-
democratic elements cannot come to power through lawful means).  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Old regimes fall and new regimes rise in situations of great uncer-
tainty. In these situations, constitution-making is likely to be a key event 
in shaping the character of the new regime. The character of the Egyptian 
and Libyan regimes, for example, is likely to be worked out largely as a 
result of the battles fought and compromises struck as new constitutions 
are written in each country. Yet constitution-making is a dangerous and 
often socially-traumatic event. In a broad range of situations, we should 
be most worried about constructing a robust model of constitution-
making that seeks to avoid a breakdown of democracy.  
But constructing such a model of constitution-making is quite diffi-
cult. As noted in Part III, domestic constitutional rules are often no help, 
because ideologically there is a long tradition of seeing constitution-
making as an event outside of the existing constitutional order. In the 
classical view popularized by Sieyes, Schmitt, and Kelsen, revolutionary 
legal change cannot, logically, be constrained by existing institutions. 
Moreover, international law does nothing to fill this gap—it continues to 
struggle to reach into the “black box” of domestic political change. Final-
ly, there is a critical practical problem: those institutions capable of re-
straining undemocratic elements during transitions have often been 
weakened by the transition process, and may be viewed as illegitimate. 
Like the military in Egypt, they may have lost much of their capacity to 
command respect, and may themselves have questionable pro-democratic 
credentials.  
In this context, the search for constraint on the constitution-making 
process is a kind of triage. Even damaged and distrusted domestic institu-
tions like the Egyptian military and judiciary may be useful in stabilizing 
new regimes and in acting as a counterbalance to would-be hegemonic 
political forces. A restricted democracy, with the military hemming in 
electoral politics, may be a reasonable tradeoff against the possibility of a 
democratic breakdown. International institutions could also play a 
stronger role in backing up domestic institutions. As noted in Part II, 
international law says little about democracy and even less about situa-
tions that are not coups or other ruptures in the institutional order. But at 
the least, we can develop a set of principles to be used by the internation-
al community when evaluating the proposed constitutional assemblies in 
Egypt and in other new or reconstituted democracies. In so doing, the 
international community can help ensure the emergence of vibrant de-
mocracies.  
 
